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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the influence of the
business community on the formulation of public policy in Birmingham,
Alabama. It will describe the process by which the Birmingham business
community sought to rid the city of its incumbent government officials by
changing the city's governmental structure. Given this as the crux of
the study, the movement by the business community to rid the city of its
incumbent government officials will be traced from its initiation in 1960
until its completion. The study will reveal the dominant role of the
business community in bringing about the change in the governmental
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The early establishment and development of the American cities
was based primarily upon the interest of the business leaders in those
communities. In order to enhance the development and the growth of
commerce through trade and industry, it was the business community that
generally ran the city government and was responsible for any reform
movements which took place. ^ In the following pages we will examine
the influence of the business community on the formulation of public
policy in Birmingham, Alabama.
Birmingham, Alabama was founded by businessmen who were in¬
terested in establishing a commercial center. Two northern real estate
speculators, attracted by the rich iron deposits of Birmingham, founded
the city in 1871. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, realizing the
town's potential completed the North and South Railroad to Decatur,
intersecting with the Alabama and Chattanooga near Birmingham. With
the officials investing in real estate in the area, running special trains
^Blaine A. Brownell and David R. Goldfield, eds.. The City in
Southern History, (Port Washington, New York, 1977), p. 110.
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in the new iron mills and providing lower rates for southern pig iron, many
perspective investors were drawn to the site. But the cholera epidemic and
the effects of the Panic of 1873 slowed the growth rate of the city. How¬
ever, in 1883 when the City of Birmingham was linked to Atlanta by the
Georgia Pacific Railroad, new lines soon connected the isolated community
with major cities in the North and South, thus the population of Birmingham
2
had climbed from a meager 26, 178 inhabitants in 1890 to 132,685 in 1910.
Since the founding of the city until the mid-1960's, the city's
economy had been based on the iron, steel and coal industries, with a
3
majority of the city's employees being employed in these industries. Almost
from its beginning the economic and political spheres in Birmingham have
been dominated by large corporations, mercantile enterprises, industrial
4
concerns and professional classes. The most prominent of the above groups
were the United States Steel Corporation, United States Pipe Company and
until its dissolution, the Elyton Land Company. It was the Elyton Land
Company which was responsible for mapping out the city and selling plots of
5
land to residents and developers. "These three groups not only developed
^Ibid., p. 107.
3
Damon Keeling, "The Bourgeois" (Unpublished Research Paper,
Atlanta University, 1976), p. 9.
**Carl V. Harris, Political Power in Birmingham 1871-1921,
(Tennessee, 1977), p. 39.
^Interview with George Seibles, former mayor of Birmingham,
Birmingham, Alabama, 2 February, 1980.
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economic cooperation among themselves and their members, but also asserted
g
their common interest in politics."
The business community in Birmingham since 1907 has been dominated
by the United States Steel Corporation. U S Steel has used its power at
the city, county and state levels of government to further its economic
interest at the expense of the residents of the city. According to Charles
Levine:
During most of the period from 1871 until 1976, local decision-making
was dominated by the managers of Birmingham's steel industry, es¬
pecially U S Steel. By carefully manipulating elected officials, the
steel industry was able to influence zoning, taxation, annexation
and pollution policies. The industry interest In the city's growth
however stopped at economic self-interest.^
Birmingham, like many other cities has been plagued with racism and
inequality. However, during the late 1950's and early 1960's, the city
deteriorated to a state of racial intolerance. Racism was so prevalent and
pervasive that Civil Rights Activist Martin Luther King, Jr. once referred
g
to Birmingham as "the most segregated city in the United States." These
racial attitudes were perpetuated and reinforced by the business community's
Interference and involvement in politics at the city and state levels, with
the support of former mayors and commissioners. "Their attitudes were
responsible for the presence of two socioeconomic patterns that emerged
in Birmingham and which proved to be incompatible - racial segregation
6
Harris, Political Power in Birmingham, p. 39.
^Charles Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor,
(Massachusetts, 1974), p. 85.




and economic growth." By manipulating state and local politicians through
lobbying the business community was able to influence various legislative
measures in their interest. However, the business leaders' Interest in
growth stopped at economic self-interest. In the area of race relations
they adopted a posture of nonintervention in local affairs, but they did es¬
tablish separate recruitment and promotion systems for black and white
employees.*^
The racial conflict and civil rights demonstrations during 1963
coupled with the violent response by local authorities (notably Eugene "Bull"
Connors, Director of Public Safety) inflicted irreparable damage to the image
of Birmingham. The fact that the events were observed on television by
viewers around the world did not help to improve the situation any. Con¬
sequently, due to this negative image portrayed and the lack of municipal
services In the city, potential business and industries that viewed
Birmingham as a possible location site now looked at other places such as
Atlanta, Georgia and Memphis, Tennessee. White middle-class families also
began to move out of the city and into the suburbs because of the physical
and economic conditions of the city, such as the closing of parks, pools,
golf courses and other recreational facilities, all of which was due to the
local officials' refusal to desegregate public facilities. ^^
9
Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor, p. 85.
^^"Battling Bias in Steel", Time, December 17, 1973, p. 98.
^^Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor, p. 85.
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The business community, because of the rapid economic and physical
deterioration of the city perpetuated by the three conservative commissioners'
segregationist attitudes, began a quiet movement to sweep out the existing
city administration, dominated by Eugene "Bull" Connor. The basic strategy
was to restructure Birmingham's government. This move to change the form
of city government appeared, on the surface, to have no connection whatso¬
ever with the racial policies and attitudes which existed in the city. According
to Harry Holloway, author of The Politics of the Southern Negro, many indi¬
viduals viewed this movement as an expression of dissatisfaction with the
existing system. Other citizens took the position that the change-over in
the form of government was a mechanism by which blacks could strike out
against the city officials, as could businessmen who wanted a more progressive
12
administration to improve the physical and economic image of the city.
Surprisingly, despite the crucial role played by the business community
in the socioeconomics condition and politics in Birmingham, the previous
literature available has not dealt with the phenomena with which we will deal.
A few authors, most notably among them, Charles Levine, Harry Holloway
and Edward Lamonte, have all discussed the socioeconomic and political
arenas. However, the present study will deal specifically with the forces
responsible for the change-over in the structure of government in Birming¬
ham, from the Commissioner form to the Mayor-Council form during the
early 1960's, something with which the above authors have failed to do.
12
Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro, (New York,
1969), p. 158.
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The Birmingham business community, after actively participating in
the revision of the city's charter, took further steps to substantially reverse
the city's physical, social and economic disintegration. To initiate change,
the business community would need a formal organization; this organization
became known as Operation New Birmingham (ONB), operating out of the
Birmingham City Hall Building and working closely with city, county, state
and federal officials. The business community through ONB has achieved
many of its original objectives such as: improvement of freeways, new
postal facility, trade mart, civic center, fifty-million dollar public improve¬
ment bond issue for a comprehensive neighborhood planning program,
establishment of policy-making boards and a new airport. Over the decade
from 1960 to 1970 the influence of the business community became so per¬
vasive that at times, through its formal organization, its authority super¬
seded the authority of the mayor and the city council in the formulation of
13
public policy and the selection of appointees to boards and commissions.
This research paper will describe the process by which the Birmingham
business community sought to rid the city of its incumbent government
officials by changing the city's governmental structure. Thus the crux
of this study will focus upon the influence of the local business community
on the formulation of governmental policy in Birmingham.
The major concept which will be employed throughout the paper is
"business community". This term denotes the top managers of the steel
Industry, mercantile enterprises and large corporations (most notably the
13
Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor, p. 94.
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U S Steel Corporation) who hold top level positions in the city's corporate
area, who maintain residences outside the city, but who make the final
decisions concerning socioeconomic and political matters. All of the other
concepts used in the study need no prior definitions, for they are used
in the conventional manner.
Due to the limited nature of the data available on the role of Birmingham's
business community in dealing with the image problem, this paper is designed
to generate additional data regarding the relationship between the business
community and the local governing body.
This study shall make use of the following research tools:—newspaper
and magazine articles, books, video cassettes, and structured interviews—
in seeking to establish why the business community thought that a change
in the local governing structure would bring about a change in the image of
the city; how the city government was utilized to improve the image pro¬
blem; and to measure the impact the change had on race relations, the police
and the physical development of the city. The time span which the study
covers is 1960 through 1970. This ten-year period will enable the readers
to grasp an adequate description of the dynamics which took place and sub¬
sequently led to the change-over in the governmental structure in 1963.
It also allows a sufficient period of seven years to analyze the significance
and impact of the situation.
But in order to treat the evolution of events which took place in
Birmingham during the 1960's, it is essential to give attention to the social,
political and economic climate across the country which had a significant
impact on the incidents which occurred in Birmingham.
8
There were nearly 750,000 people in the standard metropolitan statis-
14
tical area of Birmingham in 1963; almost all of those who were black would
have preferred to live elsewhere. The widely held notion that expanding
commerce and industry tend to make for social as well as economic progress
was totally inapplicable to this particular area.
The catalogue of injustices across the nation runs on for pages and
pages. Economically the black man was at the bottom in a society in which
poverty was widespread, confined largely to the lowest and most menial jobs
with no hope of advancement. Whites not only dominated but made blacks
well aware of it. Whites controlled the economy, the jobs and the wage
rates. Segregation was almost total. Subjugation of blacks was a reality
which few individuals questioned. Blacks were allowed to spend their money
in the white man's store but they were not allowed to sit, eat, or drink in
the same public facilities as the white man. Blacks lived in ghettoes separated
from decent, standard housing not only by physical distance but also by
housing codes and economic means. The system which existed was fostered
by traditional racial attitudes reinforced at the local, state and federal levels
by ardent segregationists. The severity of the events were only eased by
civil rights legislation, demonstrations and riots.
In the descriptive study presented in the following pages, we hope
that it will provide, if nothing more, an accurate and insightful view of
14
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Alabama
1960 Census.
^^David Lewis, King; A Bibliography, (Chicago, 1970), p. 171.
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the significant role played by the business community In establishing the form
of government utilized by the City of Birmingham, Alabama.
CHAPTER II
BUSINESS COMMUNITY'S INFLUENCE ON THE
FORMULATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries businessmen,
with the authority to formulate policy in their own hands, have utilized
local government to enhance economic development. The following pages
will delineate the influence of the Birmingham business community on the
formulation of governmental policy.
The business community in Birmingham, aside from economic self-
interest, had always had a hands-off policy concerning day-to-day affairs,
specifically in the area of race relations. However, during the 1950's
and 1960's this policy was changed completely. As noted by one of
Birmingham's former mayors, the city was plagued by racial unrest, mass
demonstrations and a stagnant economy. The business community realized
that the only way the city could be revitalized was to change the negative
image of the city.^ But to change that image the conservative government
officials who perpetuated the city's problems would have to be removed.
In order to remove these entrenched city officials, the form of government
^Interview with David Vann, former mayor of Birmingham,
Birmingham, Alabama, 2 February, 1980.
10
n
in Birmingham would have to be changed. The commissioner form of govern-
2
ment was no longer serving its purpose.
Different events, such as the brutal attacks of blacks by the police
filmed by the national media or the newspaper articles which made the
front page of the New York Times which exposed racism in Birmingham, have
been cited by different people as the one most important incident that began
the movement to change the form of Birmingham's governmental structure.
But, according to David Vann, who at the time was the business community's
hand-picked man for the task at hand, it was the incident which involved the
3
beating of the Freedom Riders on Mother's Day In 1961. The freedom riders
were civil rights volunteers, black and white, who were making a trip
through the south testing the Interstate Commerce Commission's recent order
requiring the integration of all buses and bus stations serving interstate
passengers. Having been successful in their efforts to integrate facilities
In other southern states they approached Birmingham with much publicity.
National press with television cameras were set up to meet the bus at the
Birmingham Greyhound station; however, the bus went instead to the Trail-
ways bus station, two blocks away. A group of Ku Klux Klansmen met the
bus and administered beatings to many of the passengers. Some of the
persons beaten were not Freedom Riders, they were people who had come
to meet members of their families on a bus due about that time. The
Commissioner of Public Safety in Birmingham, Eugene "Bull" Connor, in
2
Interview with George Seibles, former mayor of Birmingham,
Birmingham, Alabama, 2 February, 1980.
3
Interview with David Vann, former mayor of Birmingham,
Birmingham, Alabama, 2 February, 1980.
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command of the police and prepared to carry out his promise to preserve
segregation, deliberately decided not to provide police protection at the bus
4
station when the Freedom Riders arrived.
The Freedom Riders incident was captured on film by a local news¬
paper reporter and was carried in major newspapers around the world. The
photograph depicted Birmingham as a city with strong traditional segrega¬
tionist values. In an attempt to compare Birmingham with other large cities
in the region, the reporter characterized it as a city filled with racial turmoil
while at the same time the City of Atlanta, Georgia was viewed as a metro¬
polis which was rapidly progressing without any racial conflict.
The business community, the majority of whom were in Japan at the
time attending the International Rotary Convention, were enraged at the
incident and the negative publicity that it was given In the national press
as well as in the international press. The business community, after studying
the rapid deterioration of the city's economy, quickly realized that no city
could survive this type of publicity for long without serious repercussions.^
The city's race problem was in opposition to the business community's interest
and thus, had to be eliminated to prevent a tremendous loss in profits. One
conversation as remembered by David Vann in a discussion with the business
community over the Freedom Riders incident, reveals the state of emergency
which plagued the business community:
4
Interview with David Vann, former city councilman and mayor of
Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama, 2 February, 1980.
^Ibid.
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We can't have pictures of Birmingham, the place where we live,
showing people getting beat-up on the streets, we can't have
Birmingham looking like the capital of the Dominican Republic
or Guatemala. If we are going to be a part of the American system
and participate in its economic structure then we cannot be shown
doing things like that. We have to change the situation.®
Unlike the City of Atlanta, Birmingham at this time period was stag¬
nant and obsessed with race. On the other hand, Atlanta was an expansive
and progressive regional center. However, Birmingham did not enjoy the
post-war economic progress as had Atlanta due to the inability of the steel
industry to regain the prosperity it had before the Depression. Compared
with the sky-scrapers and new expressways of Atlanta, downtown Birmingham
looked old and worn. The type of migrants who were attracted to the city,
such as unemployed miners with little or no education or skills and the
elderly poor who had left their farms to be added to the city's welfare rolls,
did not add to the city's potential economic growth, but instead tended to
add to the racial attitudes and economic stagnation which already existed.
On the other hand, Atlanta was an expansive city which had gained con¬
siderable fame for Its racial moderation and economic stability.^
The business community, after the civil rights crisis confronted
Birmingham, was ready to make concessions which would uplift the dark
veil which obscurred the image of the city due to the trail of negative
g
publicity. However, the incumbent government was not willing to change
®lbid.
^Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro, (New York,
1969), p. 188.
g
Ruthine Tidwell, "Birmingham: The Elite Approach" (Unpublished
Research Paper, Atlanta University, 1979), p. 8.
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despite the bad publicity generated by their actions which tarnished the
image of the city. According to Charles Levine, the severity of the
measures taken by the commissioners against the Freedom Riders aroused
fears among the businessmen that the city's already weak economy might be
damaged by further erosion of its image. After an extensive study by the
Birmingham Bar Association on behalf of the business community revealing
the racial "excesses" of "Bull" Connor where race relations were concerned,
a reorganization plan began to change the governmental structure of
9
Birmingham's government.
The business community also thought that a change in the local
governmental structure would bring about a change in the image of the city
because once the structure was changed, gone would be the individuals
who had been responsible for the negative image. The head of the Chamber
of Commerce, Sidney Smyer, delivered a strong endorsement for the re¬
organization in government stating, "It is brutally clear that we need to do
something about Birmingham's image.The Birmingham Post-Herald's
view of the situation was:
The only way to change this false image is by changing governmental
leadership, and to change the leadership you have to change the form
of government; the city's dilemma is rapidly growing worse because
some political leaders here have in effect volunteered Birmingham for
the next big battle ground.
g
Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor, p. 86.
^^Interview with David Vann, 2 February, 1980.
^^Edward Lamonte, "Politics and Welfare in Birmingham, Alabama:
1900-1975" (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1976), p. 61.
12
Birmingham Post-Herald, 5 March, 1963.
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Thus, the business community turned their backs on the commis¬
sioner form of government and Connor's administration, whom they had
supported for re-election only two weeks earlier and pushed for a change
in the governmental structure of the city. Even the two local newspapers,
the Birmingham News and the Birmingham Post-Herald, who had before this
time been denigrated by other national newspapers like the New York Times
and the Washington Post for their lack of progressive news reporting, now
criticized the commissioners for their lack of progressive leadership ability.
The two local newspapers, who earlier had endorsed the commissioners for
re-election, now questioned them about their lack of ability to provide
13
adequate police protection for the civil rights demonstrators. The local
newspapers began to push along with the business community for a change
In the structure of the city government.
The business community had supported segregation in Birmingham
for over fifty years because that was the way to have a peaceful community
14
in which to do business and to make money. But Martin Luther King, Jr.
responded to segregation in Birmingham by stating if you want a peaceful
community you have to find some way to desegregate it. It is not going to
be peaceful until you find some way to respond to the needs of the people
involved.
Primarily because the race problem was hindering economic as well
as physical growth, the business community instigated a reorganization
13
Birmingham Post-Herald, 5 March, 1963.
14
Interview with David Vann, 2 February, 1980.
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movement to deal with the problem at hand. Looking back, the basic pro¬
gram to reorganize the city's governmental structure In Birmingham began
with the adoption by the State Legislature, at the request of the delegation
from Jefferson County, of the Council-Manager Act of 1955. The Jefferson
County Delegation had pushed for the Council Manager government as an
alternative form of government available to Birmingham by the process of
petition and referendum. However, after considerable thought (and with
insistent manipulation of the delegates by Birmingham's Commissioners),
the delegation decided that Birmingham in all likelihood would not adopt a
form of government which would introduce an outsider as the director-
manager of the affairs of the city. Thus, they decided to add, as a third
alternative form of government, the mayor-council model. In order to do
this in the simplest way possible they took the model of the council-manager
charter already adopted and changed the name "City Manager" to "Mayor"
everywhere It appeared and added a section providing for electing the
16
mayor. The council and all other provisions remained the same.
The mayor-council model of government provided for a governmental
system with a nine-man legislative council elected at large. After the election
of the first nine-member council, five members will come up for re-election
every two years, four of the council seats will be occupied for four-year
terms, the fifth council seat will be occupied for a term of two years. This
system provides that eight council members will always serve four-year
terms and that the majority of the council members will not have to run for
16
David Vann, Speech delivered at the Duard Legrand Conference,
Birmingham, Alabama, 15 November, 1978, pp. 4-5.
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re-election every two years. It was learned, after the adoption of the
mayor-council charter, that the Birmingham Commissioners persuaded the
legislative delegates to sponsor the mayor-council act. They had the plan
drawn up to create a third opposition, if there ever was a referendum, to
create a run-off. If there was a run-off between the two top charters,
then the commissioner form of government would surely win if only for the
18
reason that it was the incumbent government. Ironically, the brain-child
of the commissioners ultimately resulted in their downfall.
As business leaders living outside of the city, but having vested
interest within, the business community felt that they could not publicly
initiate the effort to change the form of government during the early 1960's.
Therefore, they sought the help of the Birmingham Bar Association which
formed a committee to conduct a study to determine the "present and future
19
governmental needs of a greater and better Birmingham." The study
completed in 1962 revealed that Birmingham would be better served by a
20
mayor-council form of government rather than the commissioner form.
The next step in the process of changing the governmental form
was the formation of the Senior Citizens Committee, which was composed of




Birmingham Post-Herald, 3 April, 1963.
20
David Vann, "Birmingham's Change in Government", Lecture
given at the University of Alabama in Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama,
29 July, 1973.
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white citizens who wanted the city to progress. Its membership included
the heads of almost every major business, law firm and professional group
in the city. The business leaders, furnishing the financial backing for
newspaper, radio, and television ads, used this committee as their own
21
pawn to openly make the moves that they themselves were unable to make.
In the summer of 1962, 12,000 signatures were obtained on petitions
to have the government structure changed, even though only 7,000 signa-
22
tures were needed to move to the next step, the referendum. This
election was held on November 6, 1962 after being called by Judge J. Paul
Meeks, due to the Mayor's refusal to call it. The mayor-council form of
government, after a long and hard struggle, won out in the election with
fifty-two percent of the thirty-eight thousand votes cast. The incumbent
commissioner form of government and the manager-council form finished
second and third, respectively.
The final move In the struggle to select new government officials
came on March 5, 1963, when the first election was held for the mayor-
council candidates. The returns were Albert Boutwell leading with 17,434
votes, Eugene "Bull" Connor with 13,780 votes, and Tom King with 11,659
votes. As a result, a run-off election was held between Boutwell 29,623
votes, Connor 21,000 votes. Albert Boutwell became the first mayor of
23
Birmingham under the mayor-council form of government.
21
Interview with Joseph Knight, Director of Economic Development,
Birmingham, Alabama, 2 February, 1980.
22
David Vann, Speech delivered at the Duard Conference, p. 23.
23
Birmingham News, 6 March and 3 April, 1963.
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At last the battle for the new form of government had been won,
but the war was not over yet. For a period of thirty-eight days, Birming¬
ham had two governments, the commissioner form and the mayor-council
form. The commissioners (who would have had less than seven months
remaining on their terms had not the referendum taken place) contended,
24
"we were elected for four years and we're not leaving." Two weeks
after the election the new government filed suit against the old government.
One week later Judge E. Bowron entered an order holding that the mayor-
council government was the legal and proper government in the City of
Birmingham. The commissioners, refusing to accept this decision, filed a
one-thousand dollar appeal bond and by virtue of this bond they remained
25
in office until the appeal could be ruled on by the Alabama Supreme Court.
Also with the establishment of the new governmental structure in
Birmingham and the election of its first officials came the peak of racial
demonstrations. The demonstrations came on April 4, 1963, two days after
the election, led by Birmingham's Southern Christian Leadership Conference
and Martin Luther King, Jr., who declared Birmingham as the symbol of
racial segregation and decided to stage the demonstrations against the
advice of cautious liberals. Benjamin Muse referred to it as a "hot bed of
26
explosive intolerance." Blacks in Birmingham were demonstrating for
their basic civil rights which had been denied them by the repressive
24
David Vann, Speech delivered at Duard Conference, pp. 29,35.
25,. ..Ibid.
26
Benjamin Muse; The American Negro Revolution, (Blooming,
1968), p. 5.
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political regime under the auspices of Eugene "Bull" Connor. Black ministers
provided local leadership in the civil rights activities, with the black churches
27
serving as the staging ground for the demonstrations. The activities of
the demonstrators included peaceful mass marches In the downtown area in
order to desegregate schools, theaters, restaurants and other public facili¬
ties.
But the demonstrators never got very far in their activities. They
were attacked and stopped by the Commissioner of Public Safety, "Bull"
Connor. He used police dogs, high pressured fire hoses, black jacks, jail
arrest and any other method he could think of to stop the men, women and
children who demanded freedom from the restrictions which applied to blacks
alone. By the time a compromise had been agreed upon by the black commu¬
nity and the business community on May 7, 1963, over two-thousand demon¬
strators had been incarcerated in the Birmingham and Jefferson County
. 28
jails.
The Birmingham Post-Herald was more specific concerning "Bull"
Connor, when it wrote:
Birmingham simply can't afford such leadership at city hall any
longer. It has held us back for too long and cost us far too
much already ... to present him as Birmingham's first citizen
or even as a representative citizen is unthinkable.^^
The business community found themselves trapped In a situation they helped
27„.Birmingham Post-Herald, 5 March, 1963.
28
Vann, Speech delivered at the Duard Conference, p. 23.
29„.
Birmingham Post-Herald, 5 March, 1963.
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to create by their own acquiescence to the methods of authority used by
the incumbent government. They were spared further economic stagnation
and national embarrassment when on May 23, 1963 the Supreme Court of
Alabama handed down its decision upholding the new government, the mayor-
council form, as the legitimate government. The following chapter will
describe the effectiveness of the new governmental structure and the new
city officials in dealing with the revitalization of the city and promoting the
kind of image of the city desired by Birmingham's business community.
CHAPTER HI
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CITY'S NEW GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IN
MEETING PERCEIVED NEEDS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
The City of Birmingham's new mayor-council governmental structure
was much different from the old commissioner form in that the new govern¬
mental structure limited the formal authority of the mayor, whereas the
former commissioners had seemingly unlimited authority. Under the new
charter the Alabama law stipulated that the state legislature would retain a
substantial amount of authority over local affairs. The charter also decen¬
tralized many of the responsibilities of local policy-making, taking it out of
the hands of a few individuals and placing it in the hands of a number of
semi-autonomous boards and commissions. ^ As a result the mayor does not
command the authority to centralize policy-making and control Implemen¬
tation. But since the proponents of the reorganization movement sought
to check many of the excesses of the commissioners, a weakened chief
executive or mayor fitted neatly into their plans.
As an example of his limited authority, the mayor of Birmingham
is constrained primarily by his power to appoint. Although the mayor
^Charles Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor,
(Massachusetts, 1974), pp. 87-88.
22
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may appoint department heads from a list of three candidates chosen by
the Jefferson County Personnel Board, he is unable to remove departmental
heads or other employees protected by the civil service system. The mayor
is also limited in his power to appoint members to the city's most important
2
boards and commissions. This power was given solely to the city council.
In addition to these legal boundaries, the influence of Birmingham's
mayor is also constrained by racial polarization and the city's history of
violent and repressive racial conflict. Even before the governmental
structure of the city was changed, it had become obvious that the black
community in Birmingham was becoming more politically powerful through its
rise in population growth and thus an increase in its electorate. But since
Birmingham's electorate remained two-thirds white throughout the 1960's
and many whites opposed racial accommodation, racial conditions in the city
improved only superficially and at the same time, the relationship between
3
the police department and the black community did not improve any.
The dilemma of the black community was reinforced by the racist
attitudes endemic in the city's police department. The chief of police
during this time was Jamie Moore, a contemporary of Eugene "Bull" Connor
during the commissioner era of government. He was known as a moderate
in the white community, but in the black community he was a known racist.
During his administration the police department ran rampant in the black
^Ibid.
3
Interview with Rev. Abraham Woods, president of the Birmingham
Chapter of SCLC, Birmingham, Alabama, 14 March, 1980.
24
community. Hundreds of brutality reports poured into city hall and the
4
department Itself. However, Moore refused to relent. He was asked to
resign by Mayor Seibles but he refused, and resisted any suggestion that he
or his subordinates change their behavior. Finally, through the efforts of
the business community, Moore was appointed as an assistant to Alabama's
attorney general, thus saving the image of Birmingham from further
erosion.^ As one police officer summed up the situation, "during the early
and mid-sixties, racial attitudes towards blacks were negative and abundant
in the department, but a change In the behavior and attitudes of officers
g
developed after the Connor and Moore administrations."
Under the new city governmental structure, all segregationist
laws were repealed and many public facilities were desegregated. Cone was
Eugene Connor with his racist attitudes, but in his place came Albert
Boutwell with covert oppression, integration and accommodation:
The Boutwell-Connor context was a choice between styles rather
than ideologies. Both men were firmly established as segre¬
gationists, but Boutwell's credentials as a diplomat stood in marked
contrast to Connor's reputation as a hard-line segregationist.^
Under Boutwell's administration few changes were made in the area of police
reform or race relations. The new government was hesitant in providing
strong leadership to bridge the gap between the races. Blacks who had
‘‘ibid.
^Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor, p. 97.
g
Interview with Captain John Goforth, member of Birmingham
police department, Birmingham, Alabama, 31 January, 1980.
^Levine, Racial Conflict, p. 91.
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actively sought to have the governmental structure changed as well as have
the conservative city officials removed by voting in the elections were no
better off socially, economically or politically than they were before the
change-over in government took place.
Mayor Boutwell and the city council organized the first biracial
committee in the history of Birmingham, the Committee of Community Affairs,
whose purpose was to deal with the major problems confronting both blacks
and whites and to create a means to keep communication open between the
two groups. However, according to Rev. Abraham Woods, president of the
Birmingham Chapter of SCLC, "the bl-racial committee entered into more
dialogue than action, thus it proved ineffective. The black community,
disappointed with the rate of change had to look elsewhere for help. It came
g
to look upon Boutwell as a sophisticated 'Bull' Connor."
In a real sense the black community was no better off under the new
city governmental structure because no blacks were members of the city
council, police force, fire department, or city boards. Only a limited
number of blacks were permitted to work in downtown offices or department
stores.
Realizing that the new city leader. Mayor Boutwell, was too con¬
servative and soft-spoken to take the initiative to substantially reverse
the city's economic, social and physical disintegration, members of
Birmingham's business community took it upon themselves to form Operation
g
Interview with Rev. Abraham Woods, Jr., president of the
Birmingham Chapter of SCLC, Birmingham, Alabama, 14 March, 1980.
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New Birmingham to "improve the city's national image, to increase industrial
development, to revitalize the downtown business district, to serve as a
mediating influence between the black and white communities and to spur
9
local governmental activity to foster these goals." Under the influence of
Operation New Birmingham (ONB) the city's economy, social climate and
national image improved. Birmingham witnessed physical expansion in that
new office buildings sprang up (Southern Bell regional building, the Daniel
Building, an office complex and the University of Alabama in Birmingham
campus complex); unemployment declined (city-wide drop-out training pro¬
gram was set up to teach high school drop-outs a skill. South Central Bell
set up a training program to teach applicants the skills needed to pass their
exams); and major highway projects were completed (completion of the inter¬
state and primary highway system, completion of the Red Mountain Express¬
way, and the Nineteenth Street Underpass).
Operation New Birmingham was structured and organized to serve
its members, the city, county, and allied agencies in four principal areas
of activity: Community Affairs Committee, Community Development Committee,
Birmingham Area Highway Committee and Public Relations. The Community
Affairs Committee of Operation New Birmingham was formulated to provide
a forum for interracial dialogue and an arena for bargaining. CAC attempted
to improve the city's race relations by building a dialogue between the black
9
Operation New Birmingham Annual Report, Birmingham, Alabama,
1973.
^^Interview with Jane House, Director of Operation New Birmingham,
Birmingham, Alabama, 31 January, 1980.
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and white elites, prodding neighborhoods, persuading businessmen to pro¬
vide more employment opportunities for blacks, and promoting the selection
of more blacks into eiective and appointive policy-making positions. Al¬
though the CAC was successful in influencing local policy-making and
easing racial tensions, many individuals, both black and white, felt that
the organization did not effectively represent the interest of the whole
community but that the Community Affairs Committee was more interested in
12
preserving racial peace than social progress.
The legitimization of both ONB and the CAC was found in the bi-
racial make-up on its membership and the active participation of Birmingham's
leading black businessman, A. G. Gaston, but members of the black commu¬
nity (notabiy. Rev. Fred Shuttleworth, president of the Alabama Christian
Movement for Human Rights organization, civil rights activist, Abraham
Woods and members of the SCLC), who criticized the two organizations,
stated that the bi-racial nature of the organizations was deceptive because
Gaston represented the interest of the business community rather than the
interest of the black community.
Because the membership composition of ONB and the CAC was bi-
racial, it distorted the true nature of Birmingham's power structure, which
dominated the local political agenda and made and implemented policy. The
composition of these two committees' memberships helps to explain the
^^Birmingham Post-Herald, 10 March, 1970.
12
Interview with Rev. Abraham Woods, 14 March, 1980.
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behavior of Birmingham's business community and the city's policy politics
(see chart next page). Aside from Gaston, the rest of ONB's officers
were managers of absentee-owned corporations who lived outside of the city.
Operation New Birmingham and the Community Affairs Committee were able
to promote their own business interest while at the same time buffering the
demands of the black community and guiding racial appeasement. By setting
up an open relation with the community, ONB and its subcommittee, CAC,
were able to convince the citizens that they were providing a worthwhile
service by promoting city-wide progress. Thus both ONB and the CAC
were given great latitude and legitimacy by the whole community.
Despite all of the changes which had taken place in Birmingham
from 1964 to 1967, Mayor Boutweli was attacked for his failure to provide
13
the city with "positive, dynamic, aggressive leadership." The business
community charged that the city government was sluggish In implementing
urban renewal, police reform, street Improvement, and equal opportunity
14
programs. Segregationists accused Boutweli of taking integration too
far.^^ Blacks and a few liberal whites were impatient with the rate of
change as pools remained closed and public housing projects continued to
16
be segregated. As the mayoral election of 1967 drew closer. Mayor
Boutweli's popularity dwindled.
13




Levine, Racial Conflict and the American Mayor, p. 92.
16,. ..Ibid.
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OPERATION NEW BIRMINGHAM (1969)
OFFICERS
Chairman of the Board Vice Presidents Secretary
S. Vincent Townsend, Sr. T. E. Bradford Kenneth T. Perrine
President
Dr. A. G. Gaston
Fred Weil, Sr.
T reasurer
Albert L. Mills M. E. Wiggins Robert D. Russell
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Leon Aland W. Cooper Green Fred Renneker, III
John R. Baker John C. Hall O. J. Reynolds
W. Cecil Bauer John Harbert, Sr. J. D. Rosenberger
S. J. Bennett Emil Hess Col. W. J. Rushton
Harold Blach, Jr. Howard Higgins R. E. Schooley
Albert Boutwell Gerow Hodges J. F. Scully
Houston Brice, Jr. Clifford D. Hoehne Mayor George Seibels
Harry C. Brack, Jr. Robert Jemison Alfred M. Shook
Frank Bromberg, Sr. Alex S. Lacey Arthur D. Shores
Ben Brown James C. Lee, Jr. Frank Smith
Joe Bruno Duard LeCrand Peter Smith
Guy Caffey Joe Linton William E. Smith
U. W. demon Manuel Mendel S W. Smyer, Jr.
Jerome Cooper W. H. Metz Elton B. Stephens
Liston A. Corcoran Jesse Miller Howard Strevel
David Crabb Clint Milstead Glenn E. Taylor
J. Mason Davis Dr. J. Montgomery Kenneth Totten
Rev. Sam Davis M. E. Moor, Jr. Temple Tutwiler
Hugh Denman Hugh Morrow, Jr. Pat Vacca
B. Roper Dial J. Reese Murray Dr. Joseph Volker
John Drew Dr. John Nixon Rev. W. L. Ware
Marvin Engle Don Oliver Donald Wear
John Evins Frank Parson Tillman Wheeler
Joseph Farley B. Wayne Peake James H. White
Fred Ferguson W. Barney Peake Dr. Clyde Williams
Rev. Ed Gardner Thomas P. Pinson Fritz Woehle
Tom Gloor Isadora Pizitz Milton Yeilding
Miller Corrie Richard Pizitz
Source: Office of Operation New Birmingham, Annual Report of Operation
New Birmingham for the Year 1969.
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In the Mayoral election Boutwell faced four challengers: George
Seibles, a city councilman; George Young, an attorney and a political new¬
comer; Richard Dill, a state representative; and Earl Langer, a former
records court judge. When the votes were counted, Boutwell placed third
in the general election and was eliminated in the run-off election which
would take place two weeks later. In the run-off George Seibles (27,709)
defeated George Young (25,338) by gaining strong support from middle-
and upper-income white voters, while Young won slight majorities of the
black and lower-income whites.
George Seibles, unlike the mayors before him, was not a democrat,
professional politician, nor a segregationist. During his administration
there was great improvement in the social, economic and political arenas of
the city. He was responsible for the promotion of and the hiring of more
black police officers and the push for police professionalism in the depart-
* 18meat.
In 1971 George Young was once again George Seibles' major con¬
tender for the office of Mayor. Seibles easily defeated Young (37,124 to
19
21,482) and three other candidates whose combined votes were 3,511.
Seibles' impressive victory can be traced to votes he received in black
precincts. He received an estimated eighty-five to ninety percent of the
20
black vote. Seibles' success in the black community may be attributed to





his accessibility to the city's black population. "He was the first mayor In
21
the city's history to attend black social functions." Another reason was
the presence of two blacks, Arthur Shores and Richard Arrington on the
city council.
Given the limited formal powers of Selbies as mayor of Birmingham,
it is difficult to attribute many of the changes, which were mentioned pre¬
viously, directly to the mayor's initiatives. Although Selbies' policy-making
agenda included the gradual inclusion of blacks into the political arena,
"Operation New Birmingham and the Community Affairs Committee dominated
22
the pace and nature of the change." This pattern of influence relegated
Birmingham's mayor to the role of a symbolic policy-maker. Seibles basically
supported the goals of the business elite, thus he had no problems adjusting
to his role.
Birmingham's leadership structure and policy politics from 1963 to
1971 can be characterized as hegemonic. The business community in its
efforts to rid the city of its three conservative commissioners, were success¬
ful in getting the city's charter changed from the commissioner form of
government to the mayor-council form. In changing the governmental
structure of the city, the business community opted for a weak chief
executive with limited formal authority, a symbolic leadership position where
one could easily be manipulated. As a result, the business community
through its legitimized organization. Operation New Birmingham, has
21




"supplanted the centrality of the mayor and the city council in the formu-
23
lation of public policy" in Birmingham. The business community has
achieved the means by which it can achieve and sustain its needs, whereas
the mayor does not command the authority to carry out his duties effectively.
^^Ibid., p. 94.
CHAPTER IV
AN ELITIST THEORY OF LOCAL BUSINESSMEN LEADERSHIP
The elitist approach, as set out by C. Wright Mills, suggests
that the elite or the power elite are the top decision-makers in the three
most crucial institutions: the state (political), the military establishment,
1
and the corporate economy. Thus, the elite is composed of those indivi¬
duals of crucial influence who shape the community's affairs who make key
decisions, and who wield the ultimate instruments of change or delay;
in short these individuals wield and control power.
According to Mills, there are also two other categories of political
actors who exist in the political system, who are subordinate to the elites,
and who are allowed to play active, yet insignificant roles in community
politics. The two categories consist of those individuals in the "middle
2
level" of power and those among the "mass". Those individuals who
compose the "middle level", which is just below the elite, are the professional
politicians in elected positions and in pressure groups. Below the "middle
level" is the "mass" category, which is the lowest level of political power.
^C. Wright Mills, "Theory of Elitism", found in David Ricci's
Community Power and Democratic Theory: The Logic of Political Analysis,




This group is characterized as the political actors who vote, attend meetings
3
and hearings, make campaign contributions, and form ad hoc committees.
In reference to the present study, the power elite refers to the
business community of Birmingham, where the power to initiate and control
public policy remains in the hands of the corporate managers and who make
the final decisions concerning socioeconomic and political matters. The most
notable among the elite has been the U S Steel Corporation, which has con¬
trolled the city by employing more than half of the city's work force and by
manipulating public officials through lobbying and the implantation of their
own loyal associates at the local, county and state levels to ensure that laws
4
and policies were passed which would enhance their own interests.
The business community or the elite has also been able to success¬
fully control the city because of the limited formal authority of the mayor
which leads to a weak chief executive. In fact as early as 1964, it became
obvious to p>oliticai observers that the influence of the business community
in formulating public policy superseded that of the mayor and the city
council.^ Through its formal organization. Operation New Birmingham,
the business community was able to work very closely with city, county,
state and federal officials in reversing the city's economic, ecological and
g
social disintegration.
^Mills, "Theory of Elitism", p. 114.
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The elite has controlled the city on yet another level. In that they
have been able to coop or convince the citizens that the economic growth
and progress of the city depends upon the development of large industries.
To give validity to this statement, the Metropolitan Development Board of
Birmingham observed that the prospects for the future growth of the
Birmingham region depends upon the stabilized or continued growth of the
iron and steel industry, a growing service sector, and the rate and com¬
position of economic growth throughout the Southern region.^
However, for most day-to-day affairs, decisions are not rendered
by the business community, they are handled by the "middle level" and
the "mass" of the community, the mayor, the city council and local downtown
merchants. But when a crisis arises, the elite will come together to combine
their power and influence to make major decisions affecting the community,
as in the case of the change in Birmingham's governmental structure in
1963.
Previously, for many years the business community had allowed
the local government to enforce and maintain rigid patterns of racial segre¬
gation, where little or no public services were provided for the community
and especially to the black population. But later the business community
deviated from its former policy of nonintervention in local race relations
because it was no longer in its best interest. In fact the business commu¬
nity, because of their loss in profits, instituted the movement to reorganize
^Metropolitan Development Board of Birmingham, Over-all
Economic Development Program, 1977, Birmingham, Alabama, pp. 1-2.
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the governmental structure from a commissioner form of government to that
of a mayor-council form in the City of Birmingham.
If necessary, the business community will form a coalition with the
"middle level" and "mass" to enhance their authority to ensure their success
as in the incident of the dethroned commissioners. Thus, we can view the
power of the former commissioners, mayors and city council as symbolic.
Due to the nature of their authority, the "middle level" predominates in
Birmingham, whereas the business community dominates.
Looking backward at the 1975 election of David Vann as mayor of
Birmingham, It is evident that the business community was very much in
control of the decision-making process in the city. Vann, a lawyer and
former city councilman, had been the business community's hand-picked man
for bringing about the change-over in government in Birmingham during
the early 1960's. Van's election as mayor can be attributed to the coalition
of the business community and the black community in Birmingham which had
g
grown substantially. During his term in office, Vann enjoyed great popu¬
larity throughout Birmingham. The business community was contented
because the city's economy, social climate, and national image continued
to improve. The black community was contented because more blacks than
ever (3) held seats on the city council and one black served as an aid to
the mayor.
However, the incident which caused the death of an innocent black
girl by a white police officer in 1979 caused a rift between the black community
g
Interview with David Vann, former mayor of Birmingham,
Birmingham, Alabama, 2 February, 1980.
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and Vann, thus costing Vann his re-election as mayor of Birmingham, in
the summer of 1979, a young black woman, Bonita Carter, was shot by a
white police officer while driving her car away from a store which was at
the time being robbed by two black men. The black community felt that
the white officer should be taken off the police force; however, the mayor
refused to remove the officer, but instead he gave the officer desk duty
instead of car patrol duty. The black community angered by Vann's actions
refused to vote for him In the upcoming 1979 mayoral election. Thus, with¬
out the backing of the black community who had put him in office in 1975,
Vann lost the election to the first black mayoral candidate in Birmingham,
Dr. Richard Arrington.
The black electorate in Birmingham up until the late 1960's had
always been small scale. In 1956 there were only 8,500 black registered
voters in the city. However, by 1964, the number had jumped to 24,000,
twenty percent of the total number of voters registered. This increase in
the percentage of black registered voters may be attributed to the racial
unrest in the area. It has been noted that blacks in Birmingham tend to
become more politically involved and will increase their population of voters
9
during periods of social insecurity.
The black population in Birmingham has grown substantially within
the last twenty years. In 1960 blacks composed thirty-nine percent of the
total population in Birmingham; by 1977, blacks composed 54.51% of the total
9
Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro, (New York,
1969), p. 159.
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population. This large Increase in the black population was a great in¬
fluence in the election of both Vann and Arrington as mayor.
Taking a brief look at the election of Birmingham's first black mayor,
Richard Arrington, we can still see that the business community dominates
and still holds the most powerful positions in the socioeconomic and political
spheres in the city. Due to the fact that Arrington was endorsed by the
business community from the very beginning of his election campaign is an
indication that there was no power change in the city by any means, and it
may also imply that the new mayor does not pose a threat to the elite interest
and may work to enhance its prosperity. In essence the business community
pulled their support away from their man Vann and gave it to Arrington as
an appeasement to the black majority who were now In the majority in the
city.
The local newspaper, the Birmingham News has always taken a
conservative, business-oriented stance on most major issues, and has
endorsed a succession of council and mayoral candidates. As a member of
the Birmingham business community, it endorsed Arrington also. Since the
paper has always exerted some degree of influence on local politics (the
newspaper in white-owned and operated, read largely by the white commu¬
nity and its opinion is highly respected), it may well be responsible for
pulling in the white votes that were needed to land Arrington in the mayor's
office.
However, even with a black majority electorate and the help of a
few whites, the business community's power has not been curtailed because
39
of the restraints placed on the formal authority of the mayor, which have
already been enumerated. The racial composition of the city bureaucracy
has not changed, only a few more blacks have been added to the mayor's
staff. The number of blacks who sit on the city council has not changed.
Few blacks own any major businesses in the city or play significant roles in
the operation of such establishments. Banks, insurance companies (with
the exception of one), automobile agencies, department stores, the entire
network of economic institutions critical to the life of the city are still
managed and controlled by white suburbanites. The U S Steel Corporation,
the primary industrial concern, and the other industrial managers who make
up the business community, the elite still dominate In every sphere. Thus,
the change-over In the governmental structure which took place In
Birmingham during the early 1960's was only a means by which the business
community could regain and sustain full control over the formulation of
public policy within the city.
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